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Between the actual end of the draft in December 1972 and late 1976, the 
level of controversy about the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) dropped 
considerably. In early 1977, however, concerns were voiced in the Congress, 
the press, the Department of Defense (DOD), and elsewhere about the ability 
of the AVF as currently recruited and managed to provide sufficient military 
manpower of needed quality at reasonable cost. These concerns rose sharply 
beginning in 1979, and public debate over military manpower issues has 
continued to occupy a prominent position in the media and in government sines 
then. This revived debate on military manpower policy has been stimulated by 
perceived growth in Soviet military power and general internationdl 
instability, as well as problems in meeting DOD-established quantitative ana 
qualitative requirements for the active and reserve components of the Arrnea 
Forces. To assist in enabling the All-Volunteer Force to be rapidly 
augmented with draftees in time of war or national emergency, standby draf* 
registration began in July 1980. Other options are also being discussed: a 
major modification of military recruiting and manpower management policies to 
attract and retain more volunteers; and a possible return to actual peacetima 
conscription. 
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, 1968-1975 
Disenchantment with the Southeast Asia conflict coupled with traditional 
American antipathy to conscription resulted in increasing' pressure in the 
late 1960s to abolish the draft and establish an All-Volunteer Force (AVF). 
in February 1969, soon after assuming office, President Nixon appointed a 
commission chaired by former Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates to examine the 
subject. In February 1970 the Gates commission recommended that the country 
complete the transition to an AVF by July 1, 1971. Though President Nixon 
accepted the goal of an All-Volunteer Force in principle, the pressures of 
the Vietnam War and the need for a more orderly transition to an AVF 
necessitated deferral of the target date from July 1, 1971, to July 1, 1973.. 
Actual inductions of men into the Armed Forces ended on Dec. 31, 1972, and on 
June 30, 1973, with certain minor exceptions, the authority of the President 
to induct men into the Armed Forces expired. Standby draft registration 
continued until April 1975, when it was terminated by executive order of 
President Ford. 
BASIC ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING U.S. MILITARY MANPOWER PROCUREMENT POLICIES 
U.S. military manpower procurement policies are based on a variety 03 
strategic assumptions and broad national security policies. 
The principal manpower-intensive military emergency involving U.S. forces 
which is discussed in official DOD literature is a major war with the Soviet 
Union and its Warsaw Pact allies in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the North 
Atlantic, with ancillary air and naval action worldwide. DOD has asserted 
that such a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict would involve exceptionally intense 
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combat resulting in high casualties, and would require the mobilization of 
U.S. civilian industry and manpower to continue the conflict as long as 
necessary. Such a war would require massive manpower mobilization, 
particularly to meet ground force requirements for replacements and force 
expansion. 
This DOD scenario for a U.S./Soviet war in Europe has been challenged, 
however, principally by persons who feel that such a conflict would quickly 
lead to a strategic nuclear exchange between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., and that 
such an exchange would be so catastrophic for both sides as to render a 
conventional and/or tactical nuclear campaign in Europe irrelevant. These 
challenges have in turn been countered by those who argue that (1) .a 
conventional and/or tactical nuclear war in Europe need not automatically 
escalate to the strategic nuclear level or (2) with proper active and passive 
defensive measures, strategic nuclear war, if it does occur, need not result 
in the total destruction of the major combatants' warmaking capability and 
economic infrastructure. 
Using this scenario as a starting point, a series of assumptions shape 
current military manpower policies: 
1. The United States needs large conventional forces to permit responses 
to threats without resorting to strategic nuclear war (both U.S. and Soviet 
conventional forces have tactical nuclear capabilities). Most American 
analysts consider conventional military power to be a more credible deterren.t 
and a more controllable military instrument than nuclear forces. 
2. The United States faces a long-term challenge from the presence af 
large Soviet conventional forces in Europe and the USSR that are configured 
to pose a direct threat to NATO forces in Europe, the Mediterranean, and th-e 
North Atlantic, and to U.S. national interests elsewhere in the world. 
3 .  Current active duty strength of approximately 2.1 million, backed up by 
combat-ready and responsive Reserve components, is at best an absolute 
minimum with which to meet initial U.S. national security commitments 
worldwide, and in fact may be inadequate. The Reagan Administration plans to 
expand active duty military strength to approximately 2.3 million over t&e 
next several years to meet what it regards as minimum requirements to man it-s 
expanded force structure. 
4. Major military manpower assets would be furnished by our NATO allies in 
the event of a conflict in Europe. 
5. The manpower requirements for any contingencies more limited than :a 
full-scale U.S./Soviet conflict would be less than those for the broader 
contingency. 
6. Any military action anywhere in the world other than a comparatively 
minor show of force would almost certainly require the augmentation of active 
duty forces with Reserves and/or draftees. 
Since 1972 the basic strategy of policies designed to provide adequate 
military manpower to meet anticipated contingencies has been that of manning 
both the active and Reserve forces with volunteers in peacetime, with a 
responsive standby draft system theoretically capable of quick reactivation 
to provide manpower needed for an emergency. 
The active, Reserve, and draftee military manpower requirements discussed 
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in this Issue Brief are generated by the aforementioned DOD scenario and 
general national security policies. Acceptance of this scenario and these 
policies for analytical purposes in this Issue Brief does not imply either 
agreement or disagreement with them. 
MILITARY MANPOWER PROCUREMENT ISSUES 
This issue brief discusses quantitative and qualitative trends in active 
force and Selected Reserve strengths and recruiting, and then notes proposed 
methods of dealing with active force and Selected Reserve recruiting problems 
within the context of an All-Volunteer Force. The report then addresses the 
role of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) of the Armed Forces in military 
manpower mobilization, current and projected IRR strengths and requirements, 
and possible ways of insuring adequate IRR force levels. Issues relating to 
maintenance of a standby draft system are discussed. Finally, alternatives 
relating to the reinstitution of peacetime conscription for both the active 
and Reserve forces are examined. 
ACTIVE FORCE RECRUITING AND STRENGTH RESULTS, FY73-PRESENT 
The active Armed Forces faced numerous quantitative and qualitative 
recruiting problems during FY73 fnd FY74. (See tables appended to this issue 
brief.) Adequate numbers of volunteers were barely obtained. Recruit 
quality was comparatively poor, resulting in legislative action that 
temporarily restricted for FY74 the percentage of recruits with substandard 
intelligence or education that could be enlisted (Department of Defense 
Appropriation Act, 1974, sec. 718; P.L. 93-238, approved Jan. 2, 1974; 87 
Stat. 1041). During the latter half of FY74, FY75, and the first half of 
FY76, active force recruiting improved greatly. A nationwide recession and 
consequent rise in unemployment, a continuing decline in authorized force 
levels, and the passage of enlistment bonus legislation all contributed to 
this improvement. Quantitative goals were met with ease and the quality of 
incoming recruits increased to the point that the services were able to 
substantially raise their minimum quality standards for enlistment. 
However, some clecline in the rate of unemployment, the stabilization of 
active duty military strength at approximately 2.1 million, and (according to 
DOD) congressional reductions in recruiting funds and manpower resulted in 
increasing recruiting difficulties in FY76-77. During FY78-80, the services 
struggled to meet qualitative and quantitative goals, helped periodically by 
lowered quality standards and higher unemployment rates. All four services 
failed to meet their recruiting objectives during FY79, the first such 
across-the-board shortfall since the AVF began on Jan. 1, 1973. FY80 
recruiting objectives were met because of increased unemployment and lower 
recruiting standards. FY81 first-half results were the most encouraging in 
several years for reasons not yet clear but which may include major increases 
in military compensation during 1980, the psychological spur of the 
resumption of draft registration, and increased recruiting resources. 
QUALITY PROBLEMS 
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It appears that faulty intelligence testing methodology and procedures 
caused DOD to radically underestimate the number and proportion of 
below-average mental category personnel enlisted during FY76-80. In April 
1980 the Assistant Secretary of Defense  anpo power, Reserve Affairs, and 
Logistics) testified that serious errors had been made in calibrating 
intelligence recruit test scores. In July 1980, DQD released a report which 
stated that the actual proportion of Mental Category IV recruits (the lowest 
category currently acceptable for enlistment into the Armed Forces) during 
FY79 was much higher than previously stated figures, and that the actual 
proportion of Mental Category 111 recruits (average intelligence level) was 
much lower. The proportions of Mental Category I and I1 (superior and above 
average intelligence) were apparently recorded somewhat more accurately by 
the old tests; DOD found fewer drastic errors in their case. further 
analysis revealed that recruits enlisted from the second half of FY76 
(January-June 1976) through FY80 were tested incorrectly, and that the 
proportions of recruits in Mental Category IV for these 4 1/2 years was 
radically higher than previously stated by DOD, especially in the Army. This 
would appear to confirm impressionistic reports by officers and NCOs -- 
hitherto discounted by DOD and especially the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense -- that recruit quality declined drastically in the late 1970s. A 
new test designed to correct the faulty procedures went into effect for 
recruits enlisted in FY81 and later. 
The first half of FY81 showed that recruit quality as measured by mental 
category had improved markedly over FY76-FY80 figures. The use of the new 
mental test, however, requires caution in excessive optimism about these 
results. It is probably too early to tell whether the new test is free of 
the problems that its introduction was intended to correct. 
Due to congressional concern over the quality of All-Volunteer Force 
recruits, section 302 of the FY81 DOD Appropriation Authorization Act (P.L. 
96-342), as amended by section 9, P.L. 96-584, Military Pay and Allowances 
Benefits Act of 1980, placed statutory restrictions on enlistment quality for 
the first time since FY74. These were as follows: 
-- No more than 35% of Army male nonprior service enlistees 
during FY81 can be non-high-school graduates. 
-- No more than 25% of DOD enlistees during FY81 and FY82 
can be in Mental Category IV. 
-- No more than 20% of DOD enlistees during FY83 can be in 
Mental Category IV. 
Also, the Secretary of Defense is required to report to the Armed Services 
Committees of the House and Senate at the end of each quarter of FY81 on 
whether the mental category limitations have had a negative impact on combat 
readiness. 
There is a concern -- one officially rejected by DOD -- that the 
proportion of blacks in the All-Volunteer Force which is much higher than of 
the U.S. population as a whole, could have problematic social and political 
consequences. Other observers feel that the Armed Forces, and the Army and 
Marine Corps in particular, have become highly unrepresentative of general 
American social indicators such as education, income level, and urban/rural 
origins. DOD and DOD-funded contract studies reject these assertions or 
regard the trends as irrelevant if they acknowledge them. There are also 
some indications that recent incidents of recruiting malpractice and fraud 
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a r e  r e l a t e d ,  n o t  t o  i s o l a t e d  c a s e s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  a c t i n g  i m p r o p e r l y ,  b u t  t o  
p r e s s u r e  p l a c e d  on  r e c r u i t e r s  t o  a c h i e v e  r e c r u i t i n g  r e s u l t s  w h i c h  may b e  
u n a t t a i n a b l e .  
Some o f  t h e s e  r e c r u i t i n g  t r e n d s  a r e  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  d o c u m e n t e d  i n  T a b l e s  " A w  
s h o w i n g  a c t i v e  f o r c e  q u a n t i t a t i v e ,  q u a l i t a t i v e ,  a n d  r a c e / s e x  r e c r u i t i n g  
a n d / o r  s t r e n g t h  t r e n d s  s i n c e  FY73 ( d a t a  f r o m  FY64, t h e  l a s t  p r e - V i e t n a m  war 
f i s c a l  y e a r  i n  w h i c h  t h e  d r a f t  w a s  o p e r a t i n g ,  a r e  f u r n i s h e d  f o r  c o m p a r a t i v e  
p u r p o s e s ) .  S e e  t a b l e s  a p p e n d e d  t o  t h i s  i s s u e  b r i e f .  
ACTIVE FORCE R E T E N T I O N  PROBLEMS 
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  r e c r u i t i n g  p r o b l e m s ,  t he re  has b e e n  i n c r e a s i n g  c o n c e r n  f o r  
t h e  r e t e n t i o n  o f  s k i l l e d  o f f i c e r s  a n d  n o n c o m m i s s i o n e d  o f f i c e r s  i n  a l l  
s e r v i c e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  Navy a n d  M a r i n e  C o r p s .  A l t h o u g h  f i r s t - t e r m  
r e e n l i s t m e n t s  h a v e  r i s e n  u n d e r  t h e  AVF, c a r e e r  ( s e c o n d -  a n d  l a t e r - t e r m )  
r e e n l i s t m e n t s  h a v e  d r o p p e d  c o n s i d e r a b l y .  R e e n l i s t m e n t  r a t e s  o f  Navy c a r e e r  
e n l i s t e d  p e r s o n n e l ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  d r o p p e d  f r o m  92% o f  t h o s e  e l i g i b l e  i n  FY73 -- t h e  f i r s t  y e a r  o f  t h e  A l l - V o l u n t e e r  F o r c e  -- t o  6 7 %  i n  FY8O. M a r i n e  C o r p s  
c a r e e r  e n l i s t e d  r e t e n t i o n  d r o p p e d  f r o m  8 2  t o  5 0 %  d u r i n g  t h e  same p e r i o d .  
( S e e  T a b l e  " D l "  a t t a ched  t o  h a r d  c o p i e s  o f  t h i s  i s s u e  b r i e f . )  Navy r e t e n t i o n  
p r o b l e m s  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  a p p e a r  t o  b e  based i n  l a r g e  p a r t  on d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  
w i t h  l o n g  f a m i l y  s e p a r a t i o n s  r e s u l t i n g  f r o m  a n  i n c r e a s e d  f r e q u e n c y  o f  
o v e r s e a s  d e p l o y m e n t s .  T h i s  i n c r e a s e d  o p e r a t i n g  t e m p o ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  Navy,  
h a s  r e s u l t e d  f r o m  a  d e c r e a s e d  number o f  s h i p s  i n  t h e  F l e e t  b e i n g  r e q u i r e d  t o  
s h o u l d e r  t h e  same l e v e l  -- o r  a n  i n c r e a s e d  l e v e l  -- o f  n a v a l  d e p l o y m e n t s  
w o r l d w i d e .  I t  has become d i f f i c u l t  t o  f i n d  crews f o r  some s h i p s  s o  t h e y  c a n  
p u t  t o  s e a  as  s c h e d u l e d ,  o r  t o  man n e w l y  commiss ionec¶  s h i p s .  
T h e r e  a r e  o t h e r  more  s p e c i a l i z e d  r e c r u i t i n g  a n d  r e t e n t i o n  p r o b l e m s  i n  t h e  
m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e s  as  w e l l .  A l l  s e r v i c e s  c o n t i n u e  t o  h a v e  d i f f i c u l t y  
r e c r u i t i n g  a n d  r e t a i n i n g  p h y s i c i a n s ,  a l t h o u g h  t h i s  p r o b l e m  i s  s l o w l y  
d i m i n i s h i n g .  D O D  a n t i c i p a t e s  t h a t  i n c r e a s e d  m e d i c a l  o f f i c e r  b o n u s e s ,  more  
c o m p e t i t i v e  m e d i c a l  s c h o l a r s h i p s ,  a n d  a n  i n c r e a s e d  i n f l o w  o f  g r a d u a t e s  o f  t h e  
U n i f o r m e d  S e r v i c e s  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  t h e  H e a l t h  S c i e n c e s  w i l l  h e l p  a l l e v i a t e  t h i s  
p r o b l e m  by  t h e  mid -1980s .  The  A i r  F o r c e ,  Navy, a n d  M a r i n e  C o r p s  h a v e  
e x p e r i e n c e d  s u b s t a n t i a l  d e c l i n e s  i n  p i l o t  r e t e n t i o n  r a t e s .  T h i s  a p p e a r s  t o  
be r e l a t e d  d i r e c t l y  t o  i n c r e a s e d  h i r i n g  b y  c i v i l i a n  a i r l i n e s  t o  r e p l a c e  t h e  
m a s s i v e  c o h o r t  o f  Wor ld  War 1 1 - t r a i n e d  p i l o t s  now r e a c h i n g  a i r l i n e  r e t i r e m e n t  
a g e .  However ,  b e c a u s e  p i l o t  r e t e n t i o n  i s  r e l a t e d  d i r e c t l y  t o  a i r l i n e  h i r i n g  
r a t e s ,  a n d  r e c e n t  p r o b l e m s  o f  t h e  a i r l i n e  i n d u s t r y  h a v e  r e d u c e d  p i l o t  h i r e s ,  
t h e  p i l o t  r e t e n t i o n  p r o b l e m  i s  b o t t o m i n g  o u t  a n d  b e g i n n i n g  t o  i m p r o v e .  The 
A i r  F o r c e  i s  a l s o  h a v i n g  a p a r t i c u l a r  p r o b l e m  i n  r e c r u i t i n g  a n d  r e t a i n i n g  
e n g i n e e r i n g  o f f i c e r s  i n  t h e  f a c e  o f  s t i f f  c o m p e t i t i o n  f o r  e n g i n e e r s  f r o m  t h e  
c i v i l i a n  s e c t o r ,  a n d  i s  e x p l o r i n g  a v a r i e t y  o f  i n c e n t i v e  a n d  b o n u s  p r o g r a m s  
t o  a t t r a c t  more  c o l l e g e  e n g i n e e r i n g  m a j o r s .  
C o m p e n s a t i o n  l e v e l s  -- b o t h  a b s o l u t e  a m o u n t s  a n d  t h e  i n c r e a s e s  t h a t  come 
w i t h  p r o m o t i o n s  -- a r e  b e l i e v e d  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  t o  r e t e n t i o n  
p r o b l e m s .  Pay  caps c o u p l e d  w i t h  i n f l a t i o n ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  a n  O c t o b e r  1 9 7 9  D O D  
s t u d y  on t h e  a d e q u a c y  o f  m i l i t a r y  c o m p e n s a t i o n  a n d  a n  e a r l y  1 9 8 0  s t u d y  b y  
f o r m e r  S e c r e t a r y  o f  D e f e n s e  M e l v i n  L a i r d ,  h a v e  decreased t h e  p u r c h a s i n g  power  
o f  m i l i t a r y  p a y  s i n c e  t h e  AVF was f i r s t  e s t a b l i s h e d .  O t h e r  l e s s  t a n g i b l e  
r e a s o n s  c i t e d  f o r  d e c r e a s e d  c a r e e r  r e t e n t i o n  i n c l u d e  t h e  l o w e r  q u a l i t y  o f  
j u n i o r  e n l i s t e d  p e r s o n n e l  who c a r e e r i s t s  a r e  r e q u i r e d  t o  s u p e r v i s e ;  t h e  l a c k  
o f  s u f f i c i e n t l y  r i g o r o u s  d i s c i p l i n a r y  p r o c e d u r e s  t h a t  c a n  be a p p l i e d  a g a i n s t  
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substandard performers or malcontents; and deterioration in non-monetary 
benefits such as health care, recreational facilities, and commissary/ 
exchange services. Lack of public appreciation for the military's role in 
society is also mentioned. 
COSTS OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE 
The All-Volunteer Force has resulted in some increased expenditures. The 
most recent cost estimates, contained in Senate Appropriatons Committee 
hearings on the FY81 DOD appropriations bill, state that a return to 
conscription -- 100,000 draftees yearly, presumably those required to 
maintain current force levels -- would save approximately $370 million in 
FY80, assuming current pay levels were maintained. In its December 31, 1978, 
report on the AVF, DOD estimated costs at between $250 million and $2.5 
billion annually- The lower figure is the increased cost resulting from the 
AVF excluding the cost of a major 1971 junior enlisted pay raise and 
subsequent junior enlisted compensation increases designed to attract 
Volunteers. The larger figure is the increased cost including these junior 
enlisted compensation and benefit increases. The same DOD study estimated 
that reducing the pay of the junior three enlisted pay grades to minimum wage 
levels (assuming the maintenance of present force levels) would save 
approximately $1.3 billion per year. A General Accounting Office study 
released in February 1978 estimated total AVF costs during the FY71-77 period 
as $18.4 billion, and costs for FY73 and each fiscal year thereafter as over 
$3 billion. This figure included Selective Service cost savings, recruiting 
costs, enlistment costs and savings, compensation and benefit costs, training 
and education costs, recruit attrition, staffing policies and assignment 
costs, civilian personnel costs and policy changes, military construction, 
and retirement and separation pays. 
Another measure of the cost impact of the AVF that has been suggested is 
the potential cost involved in increasing military force levels, if such an 
increase should become necessary. Such costs could involve either the 
increased compensation levels that would be required to attract more 
volunteers or the cost of paying an enlarged military force composed 
partially of draftees at current, AVF-generated pay rates. 
Proponents of the AVF assert that it is inaccurate to include most of the 
costs resulting from the major military pay increases of November 1971 in an 
accounting of AVF costs. In support of their assertion, they argue that (1) 
"pay comparability" was a DOD objective long before the draft was eliminated 
and (2) the Government is "morally obligedn to pay military personnel wages 
comparable with those in the civilian sector regardless of whether the Armed 
Forces are manned by draftees or volunteers. 
Some observers believe that the costs resulting from increased enlisted 
turnover and personnel turbulence and the larger training establishment that 
would result from a return to the draft would actually increase manpower 
costs, unless first-term enlisted pay were reduced substantially. See Issue 
Brief 79078, Defense Manpower Costs. 
PROJECTED ACTIVE FORCE RECRUITING SITUATION IN THE 1980s 
As the effects of declining birth rates that began in the 1960s are felt, 
the number of men reaching prime military age (18) each year will decline 
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from approximately 2.1 million in 1979 to 1.7 million in 1987 -- a 20% drop. 
The Armed Forces will then have to recruit a larger proportion of the 
available manpower than at present. There is a general consensus that given 
present military manpower procurement and utilization policies, the services 
will not be able to maintain current military manpower strengths in the 
1980s. Available manpower will be have to be used more efficiently; more 
personnel will have to be retained in service after being enlisted; manpower 
requirements will have to be decreased; or-the proportion of the manpower 
pool actually recruited will have to be raised. The problem will be greatly 
exacerbated by plans to expand the size of the active Armed Forces from 2.1 
million to the approximately 2.3 million necessary to man the increased force 
structure proposed by the Reagan Administration. There is a growing body of 
opinion which holds that increased quantitative requirements, rather than 
problems of manpower quality and career retention, will pose the greatest 
threat to the continued viability of the All-Volunteer Force in the 1980s. 
SELECTED RESERVE STRENGTH AND RECRUITING 
The Selected Reserve Components of the Armed Forces provide the sole 
available source of trained units for immediate augmentation of the active 
Armed Forces upon mobilization. The Selected Reserve consists of Reservists 
in paid Status who are required to perform approximately two weeks of active 
duty for training annually and usually one weekend of inactive duty training 
("drillw) per month. All members and units of the Selected Reserve are also 
members of a larger category of Reserves known as the Ready Reserve. Members 
of the Ready Reserve -- including, therefore, members of the Selected Reserve -- may be called to active duty without their consent in time of war or 
national emergency declared by Congress or the President (i.e., congressional 
approval is not required); a maximum of 1,000,000 Ready Reserve personnel may 
be on active duty on this basis at any one time. In addition, Selected 
Reserve personnel may be called to active duty for up to 90 days Without a 
deciaration of war or Congressional or Presidential declaration of national 
emergency; up to 100,000 Selected Reservists may be on active duty on this 
basis at any one time. 
Selected Reserve strength dropped drastically after the inception of the 
AVF, reaching a low of 788,000 at the end of FY78. Since then, however, 
major increases in recruiting and retention incentives and efforts have 
assisted in rebuilding Selected Reserve strength to a level of 877,000 as of 
Apr. 30, 1981. This compares with 919,000 at the end of FY73, and an FY81 
authorized minimum average strength of 850,000, an FY73 authorized average 
minimum strength of 977,000, and an FY82 wartime requirement of 1,055,000. 
The real problem in maintaining Selected Reserve strength seems to lie as 
much in the retention of those enlisted as in recruiting. Since the 
inception of the AVF, the number of nonprior service Reserve enlistees who 
joined the Reserves for 6 years (often to avoid being drafted into the active 
Armed Forces) has declined, while large numbers of persons with prior active 
military service have joined the Reserves, usually for much shorter terms 
(often as little as one year). The turnover rate among prior service 
enlistees is thus very high. Accordingly, Reserve authorities feel that 
improvements in retention could do much more to boost Selected Reserve 
strength than corresponding increases in recruiting. 
The intelligence and educational levels of Selected Reserve male nonprior 
service enlistees (the only group for which data are available prior to FY75) 
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has declined considerably from pre-AVP bevels; in most cases, the nonprior 
service recruit with above-average or superior intelligence and a college 
education of the draft era has been replaced by a non-high-school graduate 06 
average or below average intelligence. To a certain extent, however, more 
mature and better educated prior-service enlistees compensate for this 
decline in nsnprior service recruit quality. 
These recruiting and strength trends are Statistically documented in 
Tables "Bv showing Selected Reserve quantitative, qualitative, and race/sex 
recruiting or strength trends since FY70. 
RECENTLY 1MPLEME.NTED AND PROPOSED ACTIVE FORCE AND RESERVE RECRUITING AND 
RETENTION INCENTIVES 
A variety of compensation and benefit in,itiatives were recently enacted as 
part of the Military Personnel and Compensation Amendments of 1980 (P.Lo 
96-3431, the FH81 DOD Appropriation Authorization Act (P.L. 96-342), and the 
Military Pay and Allowances Benefits Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-579). These 
included: 
-- An across-the-board 11.7% military pay raise as of 
Oct. 1, 1980 (this contrasts with the 9.1% pay raise 
received by General Schedule Federal civil servants, which 
would otherwise have been received by military personnel 
as well). 
-- Increased levels of enlistment and reenlistment bonus money 
and expanded eligibility (in terms of years of service) for 
the latter; enlistment bonuses for Selected Reserve personnel 
with prior active military service; bonuses for prior-service 
personnel who voluntarily affiliate or extend their service with 
the Individual Ready Reserve; and bonuses for career aviation 
officers extending their active duty. 
-- Raising per diem allowances for military personnel traveling 
on official business; providing moving expenses for military 
personnel who own house trailers or mobile homes; authorizing 
family separation allowances for junior enlisted 
personnel, and allowing personnel on long field or sea duty 
to accumulate leave beyond current limits. 
-- Increasing benefits available under CHAMPUS -- the 
Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services. 
-- Establishing (on a test basis) an educational assistance 
program for active duty and Selected Reserve personnel, using 
both cash grants and loan repayments, in addition to existing 
educational programs, and allowing career personnel to ' 
transfer entitlement to such benefits to their dependents. 
-- Increasing flight pay, hazardous duty pay, Navy 
nuclear-power officer bonuses, and special pays; increasing and 
restructuring submarine duty and sea pay levels, especially for 
career personnel, and authorizing sea pay for officers 
as well as enlisted personnel. 
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-- A u t h o r i z i n g  a V a r i a b l e  H o u s i n g  A l l o w a n c e  ( V H A )  t o  b e  p a i d  
t o  p e r s o n n e l  l i v i n g  i n  h i g h - h o u s i n g  c o s t  a r e a s  w i t h i n  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  ( s u c h  a l l o w a n c e s  a r e  a l r e a d y  p a y a b l e  f o r  p e r s o n n e l  
s t a t i o n e d  o u t s i d e  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ) ;  r e m o v i n g  l i m i t s  on m i l e a g e  
a l l o w a n c e s  p a y a b l e  t o  p e r s o n s  m a k i n g  a  p e r m a n e n t  c h a n g e  o f  
s t a t i o n  move. 
-- I n c r e a s i n g  B a s i c  A l l o w a n c e  f o r  S u b s i s t e n c e  by 1 0 %  e f f e c t i v e  
S e p t .  1, 1 9 8 0  ( i . e . ,  = b e f o r e -  t h e  1 1 . 7 %  g e n e r a l  p a y  r a i s e  
m e n t i o n e d  a b o v e  t o o k  p l a c e ,  p r o v i d i n g  a  t o t a l  BAS i n c r e a s e  
o f  a l m o s t  2 3 % ) .  
Most o f  t h e s e  i n i t i a t i v e s  w e r e  d i r e c t e d  a t  r e t e n t i o n  r a t h e r  t h a n  
f i r s t - t e r m  r e c r u i t i n g ,  a n d  m o s t  d i d  n o t  d i r e c t l y  a d d r e s s  t h e  m a j o r  o v e r a l l  
g a p  b e t w e e n  m i l i t a r y  a n d  c i v i l i a n  c o m p e n s a t i o n  w h i c h  d e v e l o p e d  a f t e r  t h e  
mid -1970s .  T h e s e  i n c e n t i v e s ,  a n t i c i p a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  e n a c t m e n t ,  a n d  t h e  
i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  t h e y  p r o v i d e d  t a n g i b l e  p u b l i c  a n d  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  S u p p o r t  f o r  
career p e r s o n n e l  h a v e  a l l  h a d  p o s i t i v e  e f f e c t s  o n  c a r e e r  r e t e n t i o n .  O v e r a l l  
DoD c a r e e r  e n l i s t e d  r e t e n t i o n  was u p  i n  FY80 c o m p a r e d  t o  FY79, a n d  e v e n  
h i g h e r  i n  t h e  f i r s t  q u a r t e r  of  F Y 8 1  t h a n  i n  FY80. Navy c a r e e r  e n l i s t e d  
r e t e n t i o n  has r e c o v e r e d  f r o m  a  l o w  o f  6 2 %  i n  FY79 t o  73% d u r i n g  t h e  f i r s t  
h a l f  o f  FY81; M a r i n e  C o r p s  career  e n l i s t e d  r e t e n t i o n  r e b o u n d e d  f r o m  5 2 %  i n  
FY79 a n d  5 0 %  i n  FY80 t o  74% i n  t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  o f  FY81. Army a n d  A i r  F o r c e  
c a r e e r  e n l i s t e d  r e t e n t i o n  r a t e s  h a v e  a l s o  i n c r e a s e d  f r o m  FY79 l o w s .  ( S e e  
T a b l e  " D W  a p p e n d e d  t o  t h i s  i s s u e  b r i e f . )  
F u r t h e r  m a j o r  i n c r e a s e s  i n  r e c r u i t i n g  a n d  r e t e n t i o n  i n c e n t i v e s  were 
p r o p o s e d  by  t h e  R e a g a n  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  March 1 9 8 1  as  p a r t  o f  i t s  m a j o r  
i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  FY82 d e f e n s e  b u d g e t  o r i g i n a l l y  p r o p o s e d  by t h e  C a r t e r  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  T h e s e  a r e  t a r g e t e d  on f i r s t - t e r m  r e c r u i t i n g  as  much,  i f  n o t  
more  s o ,  t h a n  c a r e e r  r e t e n t i o n ,  a n d  a p p a r e n t l y  a r e  d e s i g n e d  t o  d i r e c t l y  
i m p r o v e  t h e  q u a n t i t y  a n d  q u a l i t y  o f  r e c r u i t s  t h r o u g h  r e s t o r i n g  a l m o s t  f u l l  
c o m p a r a b i l i t y  o f  m i l i t a r y  a n d  c i v i l i a n  c o m p e n s a t i o n  a c r o s s - t h e - b o a r d .  T h e s e  
i n c e n t i v e s  a n d  m e a s u r e s  ( some o f  w h i c h  h a v e  o n l y  a n  i n d i r e c t ,  b u t  h i g h l y  
i m p o r t a n t ,  i m p a c t  o n  r e c r u i t i n g  a n d  r e t e n t i o n )  i n c l u d e :  
-- A 5 . 3% a c r o s s - t h e - b o a r d  m i l i t a r y  p a y  r a i s e  e f f e c t i v e  J u l y  1, 
1 9 8 1 ,  p l u s  a 9.1% a c r o s s - t h e - b o a r d  r a i s e  e f f e c t i v e  O c t .  1, 1 9 8 1 .  
T o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  1 1 . 7 %  g e n e r a l  p a y  r a i s e  o f  O c t .  I ,  1 9 8 0 ,  t h e s e  
t h r e e  i n c r e a s e s  wou ld  r e p r e s e n t  a  jump o f  o v e r  2 8 %  i n  R e g u l a r  
M i l i t a r y  C o m p e n s a t i o n  i n  1 2  m o n t h s .  ( I t  a p p e a r s  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  
C o n g r e s s  w i l l  a p p r o v e  t h e  J u l y  i n c r e a s e ,  b u t  t h e  J u l y  a n d  O c t o b e r  
p a y  r a i s e s  may b e  c o m b i n e d  i n t o  o n e  1 4 . 4 %  r a i s e  a s  o f  O c t .  1, 
1 9 8 1 .  ) 
-- I n c r e a s e d  f u n d i n g  f o r  r e c r u i t i n g  a n d  a d v e r t i s i n g  p r o g r a m s  
a n d  p e r s o n n e l .  When i n f l a t i o n  i s  t a k e n  i n t o  a c c o u n t ,  t h e r e  has 
b e e n  a s u b s t a n t i a l  d e c l i n e  i n  r e a l  p u r c h a s i n g  p o w e r  d e v o t e d  t o  
r e c r u i t i n g  s i n c e  t h e  mid -1970s .  
-- I m p r o v e d  t r a i n i n g ,  l i v i n g ,  a n d  work e n v i r o n m e n t s  t o  r a i s e  
m o r a l e  a n d  m o t i v a t i o n .  T h i s  i n v o l v e s  f u n d i n g  m o r e  a c t i v i t i e s  
i n  t h e  f i e l d  a n d  a t  sea ;  b u i l d i n g  a n d  r e n o v a t i n g  b a c h e l o r  a n d  
married l i v i n g  q u a r t e r s ;  a n d  r e p l e n i s h i n g  s p a r e  p a r t s  s t o c k s  
a n d  u p g a r d i n g  f a c i l i t i e s .  
S e c r e t a r y  o f  D e f e n s e  W e i n b e r g e r  h a s  recommended  t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  $ 2 0 , 0 0 0  o f  
a  m i l i t a r y  member's p a y  b e  e x e m p t  f r o m  F e d e r a l  i n c o m e  t a x e s  a s  a r e c r u i t i n g  
and retention incentive. The advantages of this proposal are held to 
include: (1) the lack of expense to the defense budget per se; and (2) the 
increased effect it would have on persons in higher tax brackets, improving 
the attractiveness of a military career and the rewards for lengthly military 
service. Some of the disadvantages are described as: (1) possible adverse 
public reaction against the military receiving special tax consideration; ( 2 )  
alleged unfairness to junior enlisted personnel (who now pay little or no 
Federal income tax Bue to the extent to which the tax is aimed toward persons 
with higher incomes); and (3) the consequent lack of impact: on junior 
enlisted recruiting and retention. 
Some military manpower analysts believe that some options still remain 
with which to improve active force and/or Selected Reserve recruiting within 
the context of an All-Volunteer Force. These observers feel that while the 
DOD has worked hard to make the AVF successful, the potential for 
improvements in military manpower utilization and recruiting is still 
substantial. They also assert that given the major social and political 
controversies that would accompany serious proposals for a return to the 
draft, all possible efforts should be made to keep military service 
voluntary. Finally, both supporters and opponents of an AVF believe that 
Conscription would provide only indirect, but still important, assistance at 
best in improving the retention of career personnel. 
It has been suggested that the resumption of standby draft registration 
will act as a spur to enlistments in the All-Volunteer Force by making the 
public more aware of the Armed Forces and of their potential military 
obligations as citizens, and creating the desire to avoid eventual 
conscription -- if the draft is actually reimposed -- by volunteering for a 
branch of service of one's own choosing. It is not clear to what extent this 
has in fact taken place. Approximately 15% of young men registering have 
checked a box on their registration forms indicating a desire to receive 
military recruiting information and/or be contacted by military recruiters. 
How many of these individuals would otherwise have been interested in 
military service is not known. Some officials, however, have stated that 
they believe that, registration has acted as an intangible, and often 
subconscious, impetus toward voluntary enlistment, as much by making persons 
aware of the possibility of military service as actually pressuring an 
individual to inlist to avoid potential conscription sometime in the future. 
The following suggestions are among those that have been made to improve 
active force and Selected Reserve recruiting and retention, or to reduce 
military manpower requirements. (It is essential to note that almost all of 
them have, in fact, already been acted upon, in varying degrees and with 
varying resource commitments.) The recommended improvements include: 
-- Modifying enlistment terms, including, but not limited to, 
(a) shorter enlistment terms or (b) a combination of active force 
enlistment with an obligatory period of service in the Selected 
Reserve. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps all began similar 
2-year enlistment test programs in 1979. Indications are, 
however, that so far these programs have failed to significantly 
increase the total number of enlistments, although they may have 
had some impact on raising the quality of enlistees. 
-- Modifying minimum physical, mental, or educational standards 
for enlistment. (This has already been clone to a considerable 
degree. ) 
Recruiting more women. The Carter Administration had planned to 
increase the total number of women in the Armed Forces to 
approximately 254,300 by FY85, or 12.5% of total strength. 
However, the military services, particularly the Army, have 
recently requested that these goals be reexamined with a view 
toward actual and anticipated negative effects on combat readiness 
and performance of the increased proportion of women in the Armed 
Forces. It appears now that the goals set by the Carter 
Administration will be cut back at least somewhat. see 
Issue Brief 79045, Women in the Armed Forces. 
-- Decreasing the emphasis on recruitment of young, non-prior-service 
personnel in the 18-19 year old bracket and attempting to either 
recruit more older personnel or raise the proportion of older 
career personnel. 
-- Converting more military to civilian positions. This has 
already been done, during both the 1960s and 1970s. In addition, 
civilian personnel strength has declined substantially, affecting 
the important depot and maintenance services that DoD civilians 
provide to the military services. 
-- Increasing the length of enlistments. This has also been done; 
however., it conflicts with the desire to shorten enlistments 
as a recruiting incentive. 
-- Decreasing the use of early discharges to separate marginally 
undesirable personnel from the Armed Forces and placing heavier 
reliance on counseling and military discipline to ensure effective 
performance from such individuals while remaining in service. 
There has been some progress made in reducing first-term enlisted 
attrition, as these early clischarges are called. It is important 
however, that too many marginal performers not be retained in 
service if they will not or cannot be forced to do their jobs. 
(See Table E appended to this issue brief.) 
-- Substituting capital (equipment) for labor (military manpower) 
wherever possible. This is a largely unexplored area. It could 
show great promise for the technically oriented services, less so 
for the ground combat forces. However, complex equipment demands 
skilled Operators, which are hard to recruit and retain in the 
AVF. 
INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE 
In addition to the active Armed Forces and units of the Selected Reserve, 
the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) of the Armed Forces is designed to fill 
large requirements for previously-trained individual Reservists to be 
promptly available in the event of mobilization. These individual Reservists 
are needed to (1) bring undermanned units of the active force and Selected 
Reserve to full war strength and ( 2 )  provide trained replacements ' for 
casualties until such time as draftees can be provided by a reactivated 
Selective Service System. 
The IRR consists mostly of personnel who have served on active duty, are 









r military obligation. IRR personnel are not currently required by 
train periodically, although they are legally obligated to do so if 
. Members of the IRR are also members of the Ready Reserve (along 
lected Reserve personnel). A S  such, they also may be called to active 
duty without their consent in time of war or national emergency declared by 
the Congress or the President, subject to the maximum of 1,000,000 Reaay 
Reservists that may be on active duty on such a basis at any one time. 
Table "C" , appended to this issue brief, indicates in detail the major 
decline in IRR strength that has taken place since FY73; from 1,229,000 to 
410,000 as of Apr. 30, 1981. IRR strength has increased from 356,000 at the 
end of FY78 to current levels, and is expected to continue increasing slowly 
over the next few years as some suggested policies are implementea. 
The projected IRR strengths contrast with estimated IRR mobilization 
requirements. An intensive interagency debate on IRR requirements appears to 
have been wresolved*v in favor of an accepted IRR shortfall of approximately 
300,000 (of which the Army's share is 270,000); however, some analysts 
continue to believe that a more accurate estimate of the shortfall is in the 
400,000-600,000 range. In either case, actual IRR strength will remain well 
below requirements at least into the late 1 9 8 0 ~ ~  under the most optimistic 
estimates. 
IRR strength has declined for several reasons. First, large numbers of 
Vietnam-era draftees who spent only two years of their total six-year 
military obligation on active duty, and the remaining four in the IRR, 
completed their six years of service between 1973 and 1976 and left the IRR 
pool. Second, the advent of the AVF resulted in longer active duty terms, 
shortening the time remaining out of the total six-year obligation to serve 
in the IRR. Third, a greater proportion of active force separatees than 
previously is entering the Selected Reserve. Fourth, longer active duty 
enlistment terms and lower active duty military strengths have reduced 
recruiting requirements, and hence the number of persons leaving active duty 
and entering the IRR. 
Without a peacetime draft or a quickly responsive standby Selective 
Service System, shortages of IRR personnel would severely affect the ability 
of the Armed Forces to fight a major war with the Soviet Union in the 
interval between the outbreak of hostilities and the availablility of trained 
draftees--now programmed for no earlier than seven months after mobilization. 
Even with a standby draft system capable of the most rapid reactivation 
considered feasible, four months would elapse between mobilization and the 
delivery of trained draftees to the Armed Forces, during which requirements 
for trained personnel could only be met by the IRR. 
RECENT AND PROPOSED INITIATIVES DESIGNED TO INCREASE IRR STRENGTH 
Among actually implemented remedies for increasing IRR strength and 
improving IRR mobilization capabilities within an All-Volunteer Force context 
are the following: 
-- Eliminating automatic transfer from the IRR to the Standby Reserve 
after 5 years of obligated military service. While this does not 
increase the total IRR/Standby Reserve manpower pool, it does 
increase the size of the more easily mobilizable IRR. 
-- Requiring a fixed IRR obligation of all active duty separatees, 
regardless of the length of their active duty service. Certain 
active and Reserve enlistees who do not complete their full 
enlistments are now assigned to the IRR, if they are judged 
suitable; formerly, no such personnel were retained in the IRR.) 
-- Requiring female military personnel to fulfill an IRR 
obligation in the same manner as male personnel. 
-- Identifying and designating selected retired military personnel 
for recall to active duty upon mobilization. 
-- Improving personnel management of pretrained individual reservists 
and standby Reservists, with better tracking and location 
procedures, more frequent contact, faster moBilization 
notification 
notification procedures, and peacetime refresher training for IRR 
personnel. 
-- Reducing the length of active duty enlistments, thus increasing 
the proportion of the total six-year obligation spent in the IRR 
unless the individual enlisted in the Selected Reserve. 
-- Authorizing direct enlistment and reenlistment into the IRR, and 
providing bonuses for persons without an IRR obligation to 
voluntarily affiliate with the IRR, if they have prior military 
service. 
A legislative proposal to extend the total military service obligation 
beyond the current 6 years has Been considered in DOD and the Congress, but 
not acted on. 
STANDBY DRAFT CAPABILITIES 
According to DOD, a major war with the Soviet Union in Europe or any other 
military contingency other than minor, short-term operations would require 
the reactivation of the draft to furnish manpower above and beyond that 
provided by the active forces, Selected Reserve, and IRR. Draftees would be 
required to provide replacements for wartime casualties and activate new 
military units needed in an expanded wartime force structure. 
The Military Selective Service Act Amendments of 1971 (P.L. 92-129, 
approved Sept. 28, 1971) required that after induction authority ceased on 
June 30, 1973, the Selective Service System be maintained as "an active 
standby organization, with (1) a complete registration and classification 
structure capable of immediate operations in the event of a national 
emergency, and (2) personnel adequate to reinstitute immediately the full 
operation of the system...." Progressive reductions in funding and manpower 
for the standby Selective Service System have substantially reduced its 
capabilities and responsiveness since FY73. Standby registration and 
classification of potential inductees was suspendea by executive order in 
April 1975 until resumed in July 1980. DOD estimates it would require the 
System to deliver at least 650,000 personnel to the Armed Forces within 180 
days after general mobilization (M+180). A variety of studies by several 
Government agencies all agree that before the resumption of standby 
registration in mid-1980, the Selective Service System fell grossly short of 
having the capability to meet these requirements. 
After taking office in January 1977, President Carter on several occasions 
reiterated the opposition of the Ford Administration to standby registration, 
as did Carter Administration officials. In his State of the Union message of 
Jan. 23, 1980, however, President Carter changed his policy. He announced 
that he would send legislation to the Congress which would (a) provicie 
supplemental appropriations for standby draft registration to take place 
before mobilization and (b) requlre women as well as men to register. The 
registration legislation approved by the Congress on June 25, 1980, and 
signed by the President on June 27 (P.L. 96-282) differed substantially from 
the President's proposal. Rather than appropriating new funds, it authorized 
the transfer of approximately $13.3 million from the FY80 DOD budget to that 
of the Selective Service System for the purpose of registering males only. 
All men born in 1960 were required to register at their local post offices 
during the week beginning July 21, 1980, and all men born in 1969 were 
required to register during the week beginning July 28. Selective Service 
has stated that by July 1981 92% of all men born in 1960, 1969, and 1962 had 
registered -- over 5 million out of 5.5 million eligibles. Registration is 
required of all men born in 1963 or later upon reaching age 18. Percentage 
figures on compliance with this ongoing registration program are not .yet 
available. A report and audit of the registration process by the General 
Accounting Office, performed in December 1980, stated that the Selective 
System's claims as to the success of registration and the level of compliance 
were accurate, and praised the System's management of registration. 
RETURN TO A PEACETIME DRAFT 
The quantitative and qualitative recruiting problems of the active and 
Reserve forces have resulted in considerable discussion about returning to 
actual peacetime conscription. 
A return to the peacetime draft would insure that the Armed Forces could 
procure the quantity and quality of personnel they needed without regard to 
the vagaries of the civilian economy or transient national moods. 
Conscription would also serve the political/social/philosophical ends of (1) 
levying a requirement on all citizens, if called, to participate in the 
common defense and (2) insuring popular involvement in and concern over 
national military policies. 
It is by no means clear that the reinstitution of the draft would decrease 
defense manpower costs. While recruiting costs could be decreased, 
utilization and training costs resulting from increased personnel turnover 
and turbulence would probably rise. Military compensation costs would drop 
only if pay and allowance levels for first-term enlisted personnel were 
frozen or reduced. 
A return to the draft could conceivably be unpopular. Some say that the 
Vietnam experience an8 subsequent clemencies and pardons of draft evaders and 
some military deserters have raised doubts about whether young people would 
respond to draft calls. In addition, there are political/ philosophical 
issues of (1) conscription as a form of involuntary servitude or economic 
tax-in-kind and (2) the inequity of selective as opposed to universal or 
general conscription. 
SELECTION ISSUES 
Several alternative methods of selecting draftees have been proposed, 
including (1) universal national service with a military option (including 
compulsory registration, class~fication, and evaluation for national service, 
without a compulsory service requirement itself), (2) universal military 
service, and (3) selective service. The proposals for universal service all 
have the advantage of being more equitable, and providing both tangible and 
intangible benefits to the civilian economy as a whole, as well as sufficient 
trained military manpower to meet any imaginable military contingency.. 
Universal service would also be more coercive than selective service, would 
establish a principle of conscription for non-military purposes, and cauld 
produce more trained military manpower than the Armed Forces required or 
low-cost civilian labor than the civilian economy needed or could absorb. 
Selective service, on the other hand, while it would provide no more military 
manpower than that needed, and would rest less lightly on the shoulders ~f 
American youth, could also be more inequitable in that only a few persons 
would actually be drafted. 
Other issues regarding the selection of draftees include: 
-- Possible conscription of women, involving the current debate over 
the legal status and sociological implications of equality of 
opportunity for women and the roles of men and women in society 
and culture. 
-- Deferments and exemptions involving various educational, 
occupational, marital, physical, and moral categories. 
-- Selection mechanisms to be used, involving a choice between a 
local and community-based selection apparatus, as in the old 
Selective Service System, or one nationally administered and 
centralized. 
UTILIZATION ISSUES 
Two broad alternatives have been mentioned for the use of draftees, if 
peacetime conscription were revived: (1) conscription for the active forces, 
with a Reserve obligation capable of fulfillment according to an individual's 
option, or (2) conscription for the Selected Reserve and/or Individual Ready 
Reserve. A third alternative would involve conscription for the active 
forces with a Reserve option to be fulfilled along mandatory lines, without 
an individual option. 
The first alternative would essentially involve a return to the 
active-Reserve relationship that existed before the termination of the draft 
in 1973. Active force draftees (and voluntary enlistees) would have a 
Reserve obligation after release from active duty which they would fulfill in 
the Individual Ready Reserve; the Selected Reserve would consist largely of 
nonprior service personnel who enlisted to avoid conscription into the active 
forces. Such a system would preserve maximum freedom of choice for the 
individual and continue the voluntary and local character of our Reserve 
Components. It would also prevent an orderly flow of fully trained personnel 
into the Reserves (by leaving Reserve enlistment as an individual option), 
continue the Reserves as a draft-avoidance route, and prevent the full 
integration of the active and Reserve components for purposes of preparation 
f o r  w a r .  
A d r a f t  f o r  t h e  S e l e c t e d  R e s e r v e  a n d / o r  I n d i v i d u a l  Ready  R e s e r v e ,  w h i l e  
m a i n t a i n i n g  a l l - v o l u n t e e r  a c t i v e  f o r c e s ,  wou ld  a d d r e s s  c u r r e n t  m a j o r  R e s e r v e  
s h o r t f a l l s  w i t h o u t  -- a c c o r d i n g  t o  some -- o v e r r e a c t i n g  t o  p o s s i b l y  t e m p o r a r y  
a n d / o r  m i n o r  a c t i v e  f o r c e  s h o r t f a l l s .  Such  a R e s e r v e  d r a f t  wou ld  m i n i m i z e  
t h e  i m p a c t  on  t h e  p e r s o n s  d r a f t e d ,  s i n c e  o n l y  a r e l a t i v e l y  s h o r t  t o u r  sf 
a c t i v e  d u t y  ( s e v e r a l  m o n t h s )  wou ld  h a v e  t o  be  s e r v e d  b e f o r e  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  
r e t u r n e d  t o  c i v i l i a n  l i f e ,  w i t h  o n l y  a  t r a i n i n g  o b l i g a t i o n  r e m a i n i n g .  In 
a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  w i d e r  e x p o s u r e  t o  m i l i t a r y  l i f e  g a i n e d  by R e s e r v e  d r a f t e e s  
c o u l d  s t i m u l a t e  e n l i s t m e n t s  i n  t h e  a c t i v e  f o r c e  among p e r s o n s  who o t h e r w i s e  
wou ld  n o t  h a v e  c o n s i d e r e d  a c t i v e  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e .  A R e s e r v e  d r a f t  w o u l d  n o t  
d e a l  d i r e c t l y  w i t h  a c t i v e  f o r c e  r e c r u i t i n g  p r o b l e m s .  1 t  wou ld  a f f e c t  t h e  
t r a d i t i o n a l l y  v o l u n t a r y  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  R e s e r v e s .  I t  c o u l d  a l s o  r e s u l t  i n  
m a j o r  p r o b l e m s  o f  s k i l l - m a t c h i n g  f o r  t h e  S e l e c t e d  R e s e r v e ,  g i v e n  t h e  m o b i l i t y  
o f  i n d i v i d u a l  R e s e r v i s t s  a n d  t h e  n e e d  -- i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  S e l e c t e d  R e s e r v e  -- t o  f i t  a  R e s e r v e  r e c r u i t  n o t  j u s t  i n t o  a p a r t i c u l a r  m i l i t a r y  u n i t ,  b u t  
i n t o  a  p a r t i c u l a r  u n i t  i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  l o c a l i t y .  
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  c o u l d  a d o p t  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  C o n t i n e n t a l  
E u r o p e a n  t y p e  o f  i n t e g r a t e d  a c t i v e - R e s e r v e  m i l i t a r y  manpower p r o c u r e m e n t .  
I n d i v i d u a l s  wou ld  b e  d r a f t e d  i n t o  t h e  a c t i v e  f o r c e  a n d  wou ld  be i n v o l u n t a r i l y  
a s s i g n e d  t o  a s p e c i f i c  R e s e r v e  u n i t  upon  r e l e a s e  f r o m  a c t i v e  d u t y ;  t h e i r  
R e s e r v e  t r a i n i n g  o b l i g a t i o n s  wou ld  v a r y  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  n e e d s  o f  t h e  A r m e d  
F o r c e s .  The  R e s e r v e  Componen t s  w o u l d  be f i l l e d  e x c l u s i v e l y  by p e r s o n s  w i t h  
p r i o r  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e .  Such  a s y s t e m  would  p r o v i d e  a n  o r d e r l y ,  m a n a g e a b l e  
f l o w  of  t r a i n e d  p e r s o n n e l  i n t o  t h e  R e s e r v e s ;  g e n e r a t e  l a r g e  n u m b e r s  o f  
i n d i v i d u a l  R e s e r v i s t s  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  u s e  upon m o b i l i z a t i o n ;  f u l l y  i n t e g r a t e  
t h e  a c t i v e  f o r c e  w i t h  t h e  R e s e r v e  Componen t s ;  a n d  r emove  d r a f t  e v a s i o n  as a n  
i n c e n t i v e  f o r  R e s e r v e  s e r v i c e .  On t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  t h e  A m e r i c a n  t r a d i t i o n  o f  
R e s e r v e  s e r v i c e  a s  v o l u n t a r y  wou ld  be a b o l i s h e d  a n d  i n d i v i d u a l  o p t i o n s  f o r  
p e r f o r m i n g  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e  would  be s u b s t a n t i a l l y  d i m i n i s h e d .  
SUMMARY 
The a c t i v e  Armed F o r c e s  a r e  e x p e r i e n c i n g  q u a n t i t a t i v e  a n d  q u a l i t a t i v e  
r e c r u i t i n g  p r o b l e m s ;  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  t h e  S e l e c t e d  R e s e r v e  h a v e  b e e n  much 
g r e a t e r .  T h e  s t r e n g t h  o f  t h e  I n d i v i d u a l  Ready  R e s e r v e  a n d  S t a n d b y  R e s e r v e  i s  
o n l y  a  f r a c t i o n  o f  known a n d  e s t i m a t e d  w a r t i m e  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  R e t e n t i o n  o f  
a c t i v e  d u t y  c a r e e r  m i l i t a r y  p e r s o n n e l  i s  s t i l l  a p r o b l e m ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  t h e  
Navy a n d  M a r i n e  C o r p s .  D e m o g r a p h i c  c o n s t r a i n t s  W i l l  e n s u r e  p r o g r e s s i v e l y  
i n c r e a s i n g  r e c r u i t i n g  d i f f i c u l t i e s  d u r i n g  t h e  l a t e  1 9 7 0 s  a n d  t h e  1 9 8 0 s .  T h e  
s t a n d b y  S e l e c t i v e  S e r v i c e  S y s t e m  was i n c a p a b l e  o f  b e i n g  a c t i v a t e d  i n  t ime t o  
meet DOD r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o r  d r a f t e e s  a f t e r  g e n e r a l  m o b i l i z a t i o n  u n t i l  s t a n d b y  
d r a f t  r e g i s t r a t i o n  w a s  r e s u m e d  i n  J u l y  1 9 8 0 .  P r o p o s e d  m e a s u r e s  t o  dea l  w i t h  
t h e s e  p r o b l e m s  w h i l e  c o n t i n u i n g  t o  m a i n t a i n  a n  A l l - V o l u n t e e r  F o r c e  i n v o l v e  
i n c r e a s i g  t h e  number  o f  e n l i s t m e n t s  a n d  r e e n l i s t m e n t s  i n  t h e  Armed F o r c e s ,  
i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  s i z e  o f  t h e  a v a i l a b l e  manpower p o o l ,  a n d  r e d u c i n g  m i l i t a r y  
manpower r e q u i r e m e n t s .  Some p e r s o n s  h a v e  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  a r e t u r n  t o  
p e a c e t i m e  c o n s c r i p t i o n  f o r  t h e  a c t i v e  f o r c e s  o r  R e s e r v e  Componen t s  w i l l  be  
n e c e s s a r y  t o  s o l v e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  a n d  q u a l i t a t i v e  manpower p r o b l e m s .  
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
06/25/81 -- The Supreme Court ruled that requiring only men and not 
women to register for the draft was constitutional. 
01/28/81 -- Secretary of Defense Weinberger, testifying 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, stated 
that he felt registration might create "social strains" 
in American society due to its being equated with 
actual conscription. Secretary Weinberger reiterated 
the opposition of the Reagan Administration to draft 
registration, but stated that neither he nor the 
President planned to end it at present. General David 
Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reiterated 
his support for registration and strongly criticized 
the All-Volunteer Force, stating that while it still 
might be made to work with increased compensation its 
overall effect had been pernicious for the military 
as a fighting force. 
01/13/81 -- In confirmation hearings before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, Deputy Secretary of Defense-designate 
Frank C. Carlucci 111 stated that he felt that the 
All-Volunteer Force should be given "a little more 
time to either prove itself, or demonstrate that it 
cannot work." If it did not work, then he would be 
prepared to state so after such a test period. Mr. 
Carlucci also supported continuation of standby draft 
registration. 
01/05/81 -- Registration of all men born in 1962 began. Hereafter, all 
men born in 1963 or later will be required to register upon 
reaching age 18. 
12/16/80 -- Secretary of Defense Harold Brown stated that a declining 
number of young men of military age in the mid-1980s may 
force the United States to return to the draft at that time. 
07/28/80 -- Registration of men born in 1961 began. 
07/21/80 -- Registration of men born in 1960 began. 
07/02/80 -- President Carter issued Presidential Proclamation 4771, 
ordering the registration of men under the Military 
Selective Service Act to begin on July 21, 1980. 
06/27/80 -- President Carter signed H.J.Res. 521, authorizing 
the transfer of funds from the DOD to the Selective 
Service System budget to begin registration, into law 
(P.L. 96-282). 
06/25/80 -- The House approved the Senate version of H.J.Res. 521, 
authorizing the transfer of $13.3 million from the 
Department of Defense to the Selective Service System 
to begin registration of young men. 
06/19/80 -- Admiral Thomas Hayward, Chief of Naval Operations, 
stated that the All-Volunteer Force was failing 
and publicly advocated a return to the draft. 
06/12/80 -- The Senate approved (58-34) H.J.Res. 521, transferring 
$13.3 million from DoD to the Selective Service 
System for purposes of beginning standby draft 
registration. An amendment added in 
the Senate Appropriations Committee by Senator 
Hatfield requiring that registration forms provide 
a space for a registrant to indicate whether or not 
he was a conscientious objector was deleted on the 
floor of the Senate. 
05/13/80 -- The Senate Appropriations Committee reported H.J.Res. 521, 
transferring $13.3 million from DOD to Selective Service, 
with an amendment by Senator Hatfield requiring that 
registration forms include space for a registrant to 
indicate if he is a conscientious objector. 
04/29/80 -- By an 8-4 vote, the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee 
on HUD-Independent Agencies approved H.Con.Res. 521 
as passed by the House. 
04/22/80 -- The House approved 218-188 a House Appropriations 
Committee recommendation to transfer $13.3 million 
to the Selective Service System in order to begin 
standby draft registration of 19- and 20-year-old 
males this summer. The vote came on an 
amendment to H.J.Res. 521, which originally 
provided $4.7 million to upgrade the standby status of 
Selective Service short of requiring registration. 
04/17/80 -- The House Appropriations Committee voted 26-23 to 
transfer $13.3 million from the DOD to the Selective 
Service System in order to begin the registration of 
males ages 19 and 20. 
03/09/88 -- The House Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee 
voted 8 to 1 to exclude women from President Carter's 
draft registration plan. 
03/05/80 -- The Administration's request for FY80 supplemental 
funds for Selective Service ran into a snag as 
Congress learnea it had exceeded its spending limit 
for FY80. The Administration's money proposal for 
registration was frozen until either Congress approved 
a third concurrent resolution or other funds were 
found in the FY8O budget for transfer 
to Selective Service. 
02/27/80 -- The House Appropriations Subcommittee on HUD and 
Independent Agencies, on a tie 6-6 vote, defeated 
the Administration's request for funds to begin 
draft registration. The subcommittee recommended an 
appropriation of $4.3 million to enable Selective 
Service to prepare to register, but not to begin it. 
02/08/80 -- President Carter requested that the Congress approve 
mandatory registration of both men and women for the 
draft. Persons turning age 19 and 20 in 1980 would 
begin registering in the summer of 1980. Those turning 18 
in 1980 would have to register later in 1980, 
and in 1981 and thereafter each 
person would be required to register upon reaching 
their 18th birthday. The President stated that he had no 
intention of modifying current policies or 
statutes which bar women from various combat 
assignments. The President reiterated 
his position that he saw no need at the time for a 
reinstitution of actual conscription. 
01/23/80 -- In his State of the Union message, President Carter 
announced that he had "determined that the Selective 
Service System must now be revitalized." He stated 
that in February 1980 he would send legislation and 
budget proposals to the Congress to begin standby 
draft registration to "meet future mobilization needs 
rapidly as they arise.'' 
09/12/79 -- By a recorded vote of 252-163, the full House defeated 
a measure proposed by the House Armed Services Committee 
in the FY80 Defense appropriation authorization bill 
(H.R. 4040) to begin standby draft registration of 
18-year-old males in 1981. 
06/11/79 -- The Senate Armed Services Committee voted 12-5 
in favor of S. 109, as amended, which requires the 
President to commence registering 18- to 26-year-oid 
males effective Jan. 2, 1980. 
05/15/79 -- The House Armed Services Committee approved its version 
of the FY8O DOD Appropriation Authorization bill, 
requiring the President to commence standby draft 
registration on Jan. 1, 1981, of males who become 18 
after Dec. 31, 1980. 
03/13/79 -- In testimony before the Manpower and Personnel 
Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
General Bernard W. Rogers, Army Chief of Staff, proposed 
resumption of the draft in order to bring the Army 
Individual Ready Reserve to war requirements strength. 
Later in the same day, Secretary 
of the Army Clifford L. Alexander, Jr., issued a statement 
directly disagreeing with that of General Rogers. 
Secretary Alexander stated that there was no need for a 
return to the draft at the present time, and that such 
a return would be "unnecessary, unfair, and 
counterproductive11 to the Army's interests. 
01/29/79 -- Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, in congressional 
testimony supporting an upgrading of the standby 
Selective Service System, stated that any new legislation 
requiring standby draft registration should apply 
to young women as well as young men. He did not, however, 
endorse the resumption of standby registration. 
General David C. Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, in similar congressional testimony, did 
endorse the resumption of standby registration, but 
stated that the inclusion of women in such registration 
(and possible actual conscription) would not fill 
actual manpower needs for large numbers of ground 
combat replacements for anticipated casualties and 
force expansion. 
03/18/77 -- Army Chief of Staff General Bernard W. Rogers stated 
that if it becomes necessary to resume a peacetime 
draft, "very serious consideration must be given" 
to making women subject to it. 
03/01/77 -- President Carter stated that he had no intention at the 
present time of asking the Congress to reinstitute the 
draft, but that he would not hesitate to do so if 
needed. The President further stated that if a return to 
the draft were required, he would be inclined to make 
it "more comprehensiven than the pre-1973 system. He 
specifically mentioned not allowing draft deferments for 
college students. 
10/01/76 -- The Selective Service System completed strength reductions 
necessary to place it in "deep standbyn status, and thus 
incapable of meeting DOD mobilization requirements for 
draftees. 
01/23/76 -- The annual registration of potential Selective Service 
System draftees scheduled for spring 1976 was cancelled. 
84/30/75 -- A11 Selective Service System registration and classification 
procedures were totally suspended. 
11/28/74 -- Under a special early release program, the last draftees 
remaining in the Army on other than a voluntary basis 
were allowed to separate from the Army up to a month 
early. These men had been drafted during September-December 
1972. 
86/30/73 -- The legal authority of the President to induct men into 
the Armed Forces expired, with certain minor exceptions. 
Q1/27/73 -- Upon the signing of the Vietnam peace agreement, the 
Department of Defense announced that all involuntary 
inductions would cease immediately. 
12/31/72 -- What eventually became the last draftees to enter the 
Armed Forces were inducted. 
09/28/71 -- With the signing of P.L. 92-129 (the 197% amendments to the 
Military Selective Service Act) into law, the three-month 
gap in the authority of the President to induct individuals 
into the Armed Forces ended and drafting individuals 
was legally authorized until June 30, 1973. 
06/30/71 -- The authority of the President to induct individuals 
into the Armed Forces expired in the middle of debate 
on the proposed Military Selective Service A c t  amendments 
of 1971. 
04/23/70 -- President Nixon proposed in a message to Congress that 
induction authority be extended until June 30, 1973, 
and that thereafter the Armed Forces be mannea solely 
by volunteers. 
02/20/70 -- The Gates Commission submitted its report witn favorable 
recommendations toward creating an All-Volunteer Force. 
03/27/69 -- The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed 
Force (the Gates Commission) was created. 
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TABLES "A" 
PERCENT OF THE TOTAL ACTIVE FORCE ENLISTED RECRUITING OBJECTIVE MET, FY 73-PRESENT 
Army Navy Marine Corps A i r  Fo rce  DoD T o t a l  
ACTUAL AND AUTHORIZED ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY STRENGTHS, I N  THOUSANDS FY 64-PRESENT 
(AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS I N  PARENTHESES ) 
Army Navy Marine Corps A i r  Fo rce  DoD T o t a l  
FY 64 973 (NA) 668 (NA) 190 (NA) 857 (NA) 2 ,687  (NA) 
FY 73 810 (829)  565 (602)  196 (198)  691 (701)  2 ,253  ( 2 , 3 3 0 )  
FY 77 782 (789)  530 (541)  192 (192)  571 (571)  2 ,075  (2 ,093)  
FY 78 772 (787)  530 (536)  191  (192)  570 (571)  2 ,062 ( 2 , 0 8 5 )  
FY 79 759 (776)  524 (524)  185  (190)  559 (566)  2 ,027  ( 2 , 0 5 6 )  
FY 80 777 (777)  527 (528)  188 (189)  558 (558)  2 ,050 ( 2 , 0 5 2 )  
FY 81 ( 3 1  May 81)  774 (775)  540 (537)  186 (188)  564 (565)  2 ,065  (2 ,065)  
NONPRIOR SERVICE ACTIVE FORCE ENLISTMENTS, MEN AND WOMEN, 
PERCENT H I G H  SCHOOL DIPLOMA GRADUATES 
Army Navy Marine Corps A i r  Fo rce  DoD T o t a l  






FY 8 1  ( 1 s t  H a l f )  
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TABLES "A" ( CONTINUED) 
BLACKS AS A PERCENTAGE OF NONPRIOR SERVICE ACTIVE FORCE ENLISTMENTS, 
MEN AND WOMEN, FY 73-PRESENT 
A m y  Navy Marine Corps A i r  F o r c e  DoD 
" I n c l u d e s  m a l e s  o n l y ,  o t h e r  m i n o r i t i e s :  As i an  American and I n d i a n s  
( ~ a v y  i n c l u d e s  b l a c k s  o n l y ) .  
BLACKS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ACTIVE FORCE ENLISTED STRENGTH, 
MEN AND WOMEN, END FY 73-PRESENT 
A m y  Navy Marine Corps A i r  F o r c e  DoD 
WOMEN AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY STRENGTH, END FY 73-PRESENT 
A m y  Navy Marine Corps A i r  F o r c e  DoD 
FY 6 4  1 . 2  1 .2  0 .8  1 .0 1.1 
FY 73 2.5 2.2 1 .2  2.9 2.5 
FY 77 6.6 4 .4  2.0 7 .0  5 .7  
FY 78 7 .5  4.7 2.6 8 .7  6 .6  
FY 79 7 .8  5 . 4  3 . O  9 .4  7 . 2  
FY 80 8 .9  6.6 3.6 1 0 . 8  8 . 4  
FY 81 ( 2 8  Feb 81 )  9 .2  6 .9  3.7 11.1 8 .6  
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TABLES "A" ( CONTINUED) 
NONPRIOR SERVICE ACTIVE FORCE ENLISTMENTS, MEN AND WOMEN, PERCENT I N  MENTAL 
CATEGORIES I ,  11, AND I11 (SUPERIOR, ABOVE AVERAGE, AND AVERAGE INTELLIGENCE)** 
Army Navy Marine Corps A i r  Force DoD T o t a l  
**All- DoD mental  t e s t  s c o r e s  f o r  FY 1976-1980 were d i scovered  t o  be i n v a l i d .  
Recent a n a l y s i s  h a s  revea led  t h a t  t h e s e  s c o r e s  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  u n d e r s t a t e d  t h e  
p ropor t ion  of r e c r u i t s  i n  Mental Category I V  (below average)  and o v e r s t a t e d  t h e  
p ropor t ion  i n  Mental Category I11 (average) .  The p ropor t ions  of r e c r u i t s  i n  
Mental Category I and I1 ( s u p e r i o r  and. above average)  were a p p a r e n t l y  recorded 
somewhat more a c c u r a t e l y  by t h e  o r i g i n a l  t e s t s ;  DoD found l e s s  e r r o r  i n  t h e i r  
c a s e .  These s c o r e s  f o r  FY 1976-1980 r e p r e s e n t  recomputat ions  of t h e  o r i g i n a l  
raw d a t a  t o  c o r r e c t  f o r  t h e  e r r o r s  d i scovered .  A new t e s t ,  designed t o  avoid 
t h e  e r r o r s  of t h e  o l d ,  was in t roduced  a t  t h e  beginning of FY 1981. 
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TABLES "B" 
SELECTED RESERVE MILITARY STRENGTHS, END FY 73-PRESENT (IN THOUSANDS) 
Army Nat l  Army Naval Marine Corps A i r  Na t l  A i r  Force DoD 










SELECTED RESERVE NONPRIOR SERVICE MALE ENLISTMENTS, PERCENT HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA GRADUATES* 
Army Nat l  Army Naval Marine Corps A i r  Na t l  A i r  Force 
Guard Reserve Reserve Reserve Guard Reserve 
SELECTED RESERVE NONPRIOR SERVICE MALE ENLISTMENTS, PERCENT I N  MENTAL 
CATEGORIES 1-111 (SUPERIOR, ABOVE AVERAGE, AND AVERAGE) 
Army Nat'b Army Naval Marine Corps A i r  Na t l  A i r  Force 
Guard Reserve Reserve Reserve Guard Reserve 
FY 70 9 5 9 5 100 98 99 98 
N 73 6 9 8 8 99 7 8 9 7 8 9 
FY 77* NA NA NA NA NA NA 
N 78** NA NA NA NA NA N A 
FY 79** N A NA NA N A NA N A 
FY 80"" NA NA NA NA N A NA 
FY 81 ( 1 s t  H a l f )  88 7 7 89 9 1 100 9 8 
DoD 

















*A s i g n i f i c a n t  m i n o r i t y  of non-high school  g radua te  r e c r u i t s  a r e  i n  t h e i r  s e n i o r  
year  of h igh school  r a t h e r  than  dropouts .  
**All  DoD mental  t e s t  s c o r e s  f o r  FY 1976-1980 were d i scovered  t o  be i n v a l i d .  Recent 
a n a l y s i s  has  revea led  t h a t  t h e s e  s c o r e s  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  unders ta ted  t h e  p ropor t ion  o f  
r e c r u i t s  i n  Mental Category I V  (below average)  and o v e r s t a t e d  t h e  p ropor t ion  i n  Mental 
Category I11 (average) .  The p ropor t ions  of r e c r u i t s  i n  Mental Category I and I1 ( s u p e r i o r  
and above average)  were a p p a r e n t l y  recorded somewhat more a c c u r a t e l y  by t h e  o r i g i n a l  
t e s t s ;  DoD found l e s s  e r r o r  i n  t h e i r  c a s e .  A new t e s t ,  designed t o  avoid e r r o r s  of t h e  
o l d ,  was in t roduced a t  t h e  beginning of FY 1981. Recomputations of t h e  o r i g i n a l  raw 
d a t a  f o r  Se lec ted  Reserve r e c r u i t s  i n  N 1977-1979 have not  y e t  been completed; on ly  
p a r t i a l  recomputat ions  of t h e  t e s t  s c o r e s  of Se lec ted  Reserve r e c r u i t s  i n  FY 1979-1980 
a r e  a v a i l a b l e .  
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TABLES "B" (CONTINUED) 
WOMEN AS A PERCENTAGE OF SELECTED ReSERVE STRENGTH, END FY 71-PRESENT 
Army N a t l  Army Naval Mar ine  Corps A i r  N a t l  A i r  F o r c e  DoD 






FY 80  
FY 8 1  
( 3 0  Apr 
BLACKS AS A PERCENTAGE OF SELECTED RESERVE STRENGTH, END FY 71-PRESENT 
Army Natl Army Naval Mar ine  Corps A i r  Natl A i r  Fo rce  DoD 
Guard Rese rve  Rese rve  Rese rve  Guard Rese rve  T o t a l  
FY 71 1 .2  2.2 2.0 3 .2  1 . O  2 .8 1 .7  
FY 73 3 .2  5 .6  3.5 12.6 2.0 4 .2  4 .2  
FY 77 14.5 19.6 5 .9  18.0 5 .7  11 .8  13 .8  
FY 78 16 .5  21.6 5.9 19 .3  6 . 4  13 .2  15 .4  
FY 79 16 .9  23.3 6.7 20.1 6 .8  14 .0  1 6  . O  
FY 8 0  16.7 23.6 7 .1  19 .9  7.1 14 .3  16 .3  
FY 8 1  16 .4  23.6 7.5 19 .7  7 .2  14 .3  1 6 . 3  
( 3 0  Apr 81)  
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TABLE "C'@ 
INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE STRENGTHS, END FY 73-PRESENT (IN THOUSANDS) 
Army Navy Mar ine  Corps A i r  Fo rce  DoD 
FY 73 759 21 7 116 137 1 ,229  
FY 77 160 106 4 5 6 4 375 
FY 78 177 93  40 4 6 356 
FY 79 206 8 6 59 44  396 
FY 80 21 2 9 7 5 7 47 413 
FY 8 1  211 104 5 1 44  410 
( 3 0  Apr 81 )  
TABLES "D" 
UNADJUSTED FIRST-TERM REENLISTMENT RATES FOR ENLISTED PERSONNEL* 
(percen tage  of those  e l i g i b l e )  
Army 
FY 64 28 
FY 73 38 
FY 74 33 
FY 75 39 
N 76 21 
N 77 3 3 
N 78 3 6 
FY 79 4 3 
FY 80 51 





UNADJUSTED CAREER SECOND-TERM AND LATER REELISTMENT RATES FOR ENLISTED PERSONNEL* 
(percen tage  of t h o s e  e l i g i b l e )  
Army 
FY 64 84 
FY 73 63 
FY 74 7 5 
FY 75 7 5 
FY 76 71 
FY 77 70 
FY 78 69 
FY 79 6 6 
FY 80 6 9 
FY 81 ( 1 s t  Ha l f )  74 
Marine Air - DoD 
Navy Corps Force TX~ 
* S t a t i s t i c s  h e r e  do no t  inc lude  d r a f t e e s ,  bu t  pre-FY 1976 f i g u r e s  
i n c l u d e  a s u b s t a n t i a l  p ropor t ion  of vo lun ta ry  e n l i s t e e s  whose o r i g i n a l  
e n l i s t m e n t  was undoubtedly draf t - induced.  The "unadjusted" r e e n l i s t m e n t  
r a t e  is  def ined  a s  " the  r a t i o  of t o t a l  r e e n l i s t m e n t s  o c c u r r i n g  i n  a 
g iven  per iod  t o  t o t a l  s e p a r a t i o n s  of personnel  e l i g i b l e  t o  r e e n l i s t  
i n  t h e  same per iod ,  expressed a s  a percentage." 
TABLE "E'@ 
PERCENTAGE OF ACTIVE DUTY MALI3 FIRST-TERM ENLISTEES WHO FAIL TO 
COMPLETE THREE YEARS OF INITIAL SERVICE* 
(Based on Year of En t ry  i n t o  S e r v i c e )  
Marine Air - Do D 
%.Y. Corps Force T ~ I  
*Estimated. These groups have n o t  had t ime t o  complete t h e i r  f u l l  
t h r e e  years  of s e r v i c e .  
